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Abstract :  The aim of this paper is to focus on the emerging situation in which open source software is 
nowadays  produced  not  only by  individual  developers  but  in  a  growing proportion  by  firms  that  hire 
programmers for  their  own objectives of development in open source or  for  contributing to open source 
projects in the context of dedicated communities. As commercial firms it is important to analyze how and why 
they are capable of drawing benefits from such involvement and their connected activities.  Moreover, we want 
to stress the different types of business model these firms  rely on and the possible evolution they are likely to 
follow in the near future. We shown how Open Source principles provide an alternative way of thinking and 
managing intellectual property that do not come up against the same problems but needs a radical change in 
the way of drawing commercial benefits from knowledge development tasks. Then we analyze the growing 
involvement of commercial actors  by setting up a  typology of the different business models that  can be 
observed in the OS landscape, how they correspond to the different strategies of industrial firms according to 
the main characteristics of their technical skills and market position. Finally, in a conclusive section we will 
draw the main lessons of  the FLOSS  experience for  a  possible enlargement of  those principles of  IPR 
management and business to other knowledge based commercial activities.
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1. Introduction
A “free”/“libre” or “open source” software (FLOSS) is a  software whose source-code, that  is the explicit 
expression of the programming work, remains openly accessible. It appears as an alternative solution to the 
question of intellectual property in the computer software field, in which neither copyright nor patents can 
bring an acceptable balance between innovation incentives and knowledge diffusion. Since Copyright protects 
not  the ideas  but  a  given expression of  the ideas,  software  editors  do not  generally reveal  the explicit 
expression of the programs (the source code) and sue those who try to disclose it. This behavior impedes 
knowledge diffusion in contradiction with the principles of IPR protection and handicaps the accumulative 
characteristic of innovation and software products interoperability. On the other hand patenting software could 
lead to a progressive partitioning of the field into proprietary owned procedures or algorithm and contradicts 
the recent evolution of programming techniques that are based on a closer relation to scientific knowledge and 
a combinatorial assembly of reusable components. 
On the contrary, the alternative model of Open Source Software -OSS-, is based on a very innovative juridical 
concept called GPL "General Public License" and its diverse variations, and consists in forcing the producers 
to disclose both the source-code of the concerned programs and any further  improvement if  they are re-
distributed/re-sold. It corresponds to a totally different approach of intellectual property rights, based on a 
weaker protection and the ability for all the actors to benefit from the whole set of innovations and progresses 
from a shared knowledge base. Of course, as in any public good question, this immediately raises problems of 
possible free-riding and of the incentive to disclose such knowledge in so far as accessing to knowledge doesn't 
depend on having contributed or not. That's the reason why the viability of this new form of IPR management 
will depend on the sustainability of associated business models and institutional supports. 
Until recently, FLOSS was considered as only concerning programmers motivated by the building and the 
sharing of  a  base  of  programs  developed for  their  own needs.  Today,  the open source  model involves 
commercial enterprises and also an enlarged market of simple users. This brings us to a paradoxical situation 
in which the development of business relies on the existence and durability of an activity of non-market nature. 
In former works,  we have shown that  solving such a  paradox requires the setting up  of new modes of 
incentives involving a pecuniary dimension additionally to the motivations of programmers originating in the 
initial movement. Such a turn still appears to be part of the current way of working of FLOSS in so far as a 
growing amount of the code is produced by employees who are paid for doing so.  Such “hybridization”, 
mixing market and non-market rationales, nowadays appears as an inescapable evolution that also challenges 
policy makers  to integrate support to FLOSS in the instruments of technological policy. It is then of growing 
importance to better understand under which conditions such a model of IPR management could extend to a 
growing number of knowledge intensive economic activities.
The aim of this paper is to focus on the emerging situation in which FLOSS is nowadays produced not only by 
individual developers but in a growing proportion by firms that hire programmers for their own objectives of 
development  in  open  source  or  for  contributing  to  open  source  projects  in  the  context  of  dedicated 
communities. As commercial firms it is important to analyze how and why they are capable  of drawing 
benefits from such involvement and their connected activities.  Moreover we want to stress the different types 
of business model these firms are relying on and the possible evolution they are likely to experience in  the near 
future.
Section 2 is devoted to the analysis of IPR traditional forms of protection in the software industry and their 
failure. We will explain how Open Source principles provide an alternative way of thinking and managing 
intellectual property that do not come up against the same problems but needs a radical change in the way of 
drawing commercial benefits from knowledge development tasks. In section 3 we will describe how FLOSS 
has progressively switched from a contribution model based on individuals' benevolent efforts to an actual 
industrial one. Then section 4 will aim  to set up a typology of the different business models that can be 
observed in the OS landscape, how they correspond to different strategies of industrial firms according to the 
main characteristics of their technical skills and market position. Finally, in a conclusive section we will draw 
the main lessons of the FLOSS experience for a possible enlargement of those principles of IPR management 
and business to other knowledge based commercial activities.
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2. The failure of the standard IPR protection means and the 
FLOSS alternative.
The question of intellectual property rights protection for computer software was raised as soon as software 
products could, in the mid 1970s,  be considered as commercial goods in their own right and not only as 
application technologies linked to the market for computer systems. Following the United States in this regard, 
Europe and Japan adopted various frameworks of copyright laws which differed according to national legal 
context as well as differing cultural attitudes towards intellectual property. 
But software IPR protection is still not satisfactorily settled by the copyright protection owing to the very 
specific nature of the software product and its production conditions. First of all a software product can be 
considered as an intellectual expression of ideas that are coded by the use of a specific programming language, 
with its proper vocabulary, syntax and structural rules. For this reason its protection has been considered as 
falling in the field of copyright. From a practical point of view however, a software program aims at carrying 
out a given task relying on the resources of the computer it is implemented in. Alternatively, in the case of a 
software   system,  the  aim  is  to  coordinate  the  running  of  the  different  components  of  the  computer 
architecture. For this purpose a software product will be “translated” from its explicit expression, called the 
“source-code”, in a given programming language, to a new form directly “understandable” by the machine and 
very far from human understanding. This new form, obtained through a “compilation” operation, is called the 
“object-code”; it is the same program but its initial expression is no longer readable. If the source-code is not 
supplied jointly it can only be restored  imperfectly and at some significant cost, through a heavy operation of 
reverse engineering. Implemented on a machine, the program is able to properly emulate its resources for a 
given task without requiring from the user a precise knowledge of the technical process that is set to work. In 
that sense it is a technology and should fall in the field of patents.
The basic principle of intellectual property protection is to reach an acceptable compromise between granting 
incentives to the inventor through temporary monopoly rights on the commercial exploitation of his invention 
and favoring the diffusion of knowledge by compelling him to disclose the principles of his invention. In the 
option of software protection through copyright, the problem is that copyright protects a given expression of 
the ideas and not the ideas themselves. Software producers are therefore not obliged to disclose the source-
code of the protected programs. Most of the editors commercialize their software products in the sole form of 
executable programs. They generally do not reveal the “source-code” of the programs, that  is the explicit 
expression of the program architecture, procedures and algorithms. This appears totally contradictory with the 
aims of intellectual property protection in so far as the owner of intellectual property is not constrained at all 
to reveal any information on the working principles of the protected program. US jurisprudence has adopted a 
quite severe attitude in this regard, strengthening the protection, by condemning for copyright infringement any 
suspected attempt of reverse engineering on copyrighted programs. So the use of copyright to protect software 
creates a distortion, since companies can enjoy protection while keeping secret the object of this protection. 
“For the first time since Sybaris, 500 B.C., who imposed public disclosure in exchange for the legal protection 
of  recipes,  private  property  and  secret  are  reconciled!” (Vivant,  1993).  The  problem here  is  to  extend 
copyright  protection to  an  object  which is  fundamentally different  from artistic  and literary  works.  The 
purpose of software is not to communicate the expression of the ideas and inspiration, but to command and 
control a machine.
In spite of the juridical preference for  copyright law expressed in the seventies, an increasing number of 
patents for software programs or even simple procedures or algorithms  were granted during the 1990s in the 
Unites States. In Europe, the European Office of Patents remained on its initial position to grant patents only 
when they are an integral component of an industrial device or process. However, the European Commission 
has more recently submitted a new Directive aiming at the patentability of software. This evolution can have 
very important consequences in terms of software industry structure and innovation dynamics. On the one 
hand, a large part of algorithms and procedures that programmers make use of all along their development 
work has been considered until now as belonging to the public domain and freely available. In the absence of a 
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real state-of-the-art in the field of computer software programming, patents are granted in a totally arbitrary 
way, giving private rights for the use of resources that had been formerly shared by professionals without any 
reference to their origin. On the other hand a generalization of the patent system would imply a progressive 
partitioning of  knowledge and  practices  in  a  domain where  innovation is  based  on  cumulativeness  and 
complementarities. In such conditions, a strong regime of intellectual property protection would have dramatic 
consequences on the dynamics of innovation (Bessen and Maskin, 2000). “Entry competition and innovation 
may be easier if a competitor needs only to produce a single better component, which can then hook up the 
market range of complementary components, than if each innovator must develop an entire system” (Farrell, 
1989).
This problem appears particularly crucial nowadays since increasingly complex software products have been 
designed thanks to modern structural  programming methods. Programs are built  from the combination of 
elementary modules into a global architecture. This approach requires both an increasing recourse to a large 
scope of software components, portable and reusable in different contexts, and a growing proximity to the 
mathematical foundations of programming. This evolution makes the problem of the distinction between public 
and private property of modules and algorithms more acute.  Copyright laws have rejected principles and 
algorithms from the scope of protection. Patent granting for software components creates, however, a barrier 
to their usage and contradicts the working mode of the whole community of software developers. The sole 
actors who will be able to manage such a situation are the large companies that will have the capacity to build 
a  large portfolio of patents.  The cost  of the defense will be so high for  SMEs that  an attack for  patent 
infringement may threaten their survival1. As a matter of fact, the champions for the constitution of patents 
portfolios during the last ten years are not only software editors but also the firms that are newcomers in the 
information technology field and that have understood the opportunity to build the basic material for future 
speculative profits at low cost2. It is also a real threat for open source software as illustrated by the SCO case. 
The SCO Group, born from the merger of Caldera Systems and Santa Cruz Operations, asserts the ownership 
of part of the Unix codes used in the Linux kernel. It claimed one billion dollars from IBM and sent a letter to 
1500 other companies to inform them of the risk they run  when they continue to offer solutions derived from 
GNU/Linux3.
This progressive but inescapable evolution reveals a fundamental conflict between two opposite conceptions of 
software development and innovation, depending on whether the core resource of the activity is to be found in 
the creative potential of developers’ teams or in the monopoly power of the firm that employs them. The basic 
distinction with traditional industrial activities is that now the main input of the production process is of an 
informational and cognitive nature.
This opposition between private property of the codes, that gave rise to the software industry, and the free 
circulation of the sources considered as pure knowledge, that corresponds to the tradition of “open science”, 
had already proved to be divisive in the software developers community like  at MIT in the mid-1970s (Smets 
and Faucon, 1999). It is at the origin of the birth of a “free software” movement at the beginning of the 1980s, 
that  aimed to  preserve the  diffusion of  ideas  and  the  combinatorial  and  cumulative nature  of  technical 
progress, both in terms of concepts and tools and in terms of algorithms for problem resolution and methods of 
coding.
From that situation stemmed the definition of an “open-source” software product as a program whose source-
code has to be freely accessible and cannot be privately appropriated. In that sense open-source software fits 
the definition of public good insofar as it is a non-rival and non-exclusive product. With the birth of the “Free 
Software Foundation” and the launching of the GNU4 project, by Richard Stallman in 1984, the first collective 
development project had as its aim an open Unix-equivalent platform. It appeared necessary to build up the 
1 See « Brevets logiciels et Linux : des chiffres qui inquiètent », http://www.journalinformatique.com/0408/040803_linux.shtml
2 It is the case of the US company Acacia, formerly start-up incubator whose sole activity is now to sell licenses under the threat of 
lawsuits.  See  A.  Chassignin,  « Ces  sociétés  qui  tirent  profit  des  brevets  logiciels », 
http://solutions.journaldunet.com/0409/040906_brevets.shtml
3 See  for  example  Estelle  Dumout,  « Le  camp  des  logiciels  libres  dénonce  SCO  dans  sa  guerre  contre  Linux » 
http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/informatique/0,39040745,2135115,00.htm
4GNU's Not Unix
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legal framework that could guarantee these principles of “CopyLeft” based intellectual property of software. 
Next,  the  GPL  or  “GNU-General  Public  License” was  designed in  order  to  protect  the foundations  of 
cooperative work development and to prevent any private appropriation of part or all of the concerned code 
lists,  as   may be done with software  which can  occur  in the public  domain.  Hence,  through the GPL, 
intellectual property is not rejected, authors do not renounce their rights but just the monopoly rent, which 
such rights would produce in a copyright regime. The main legal aspect is that, when a program is declared 
under GPL license, any code derived from it or integrating GPL code lines must also be available under GPL 
License. Hence GPL status is “contagious” in the sense that this status attached to any number of lines is 
automatically transmitted to  the whole program into which they are  incorporated.  The authors  authorize 
anyone who wants to make use of their work (modifications, improvements, additional features...) to do so 
under the sole condition that the new product must also circulate freely.
Of course, GPL has a seminal role in opening new principles of intellectual property management. But if it 
doesn't necessarily fit to the needs of any actors of this emerging open source world, particularly to those of 
the commercial firms that decide for different reasons to join the Open Source alternative. Many “hybrid” 
licenses have been designed in order to reconcile cooperative development and private interests in a variety of 
specific contexts.  They involve different ways of combining the copyright and copyleft  rules in different 
proportions (Smets and Faucon, 1999, Muselli 2002).
For commercial use, some licenses hold that a  fee must be paid to the original owner (SUN or Microsoft 
licenses are examples of that system). Others have double licensing systems, one allowing free use and access 
to the source code for non-commercial purpose, the second requiring a fee and restricting modification in 
commercial situations (this was MySQL strategy for instance). Thanks to this innovative way of considering 
the licensing tool, companies have today a portfolio of strategies to “valorize” their intellectual property (see 
Muselli (2002) for  an analysis  of the scope of these strategies),  even if some doubt  can be cast  on the 
efficiency of these open but  not completely free licenses, since users may not trust  the producer is really 
willing to keep the sources open and to cooperate5.
The other institutional side of the status of open intellectual property is the question of the recognition and 
acceptability of the CopyLeft principles in the national and European juridical contexts.  This includes the 
treatment of claims for  infringement in the cases  of  abusive appropriation of open-source codes.  As an 
illustration the French INRIA6 with the CEA and the CNRS7 settled a new open-source license called CeCILL 
-Ce(a)C(nrs)I(nria)L(ogiciel)L(ibre)- in order to offer an GPL-equivalent license that could underlie contracts 
consistent with French law. This initiative carried out by public bodies has also a policy significance related to 
the feeling of interest for open-source software from those public bodies. Their commitment “can reassure 
some SMEs that would like to adopt those free software products but fear  that such a choice could have 
pernicious effects on their own organization”8.  While the official translation of the GPL has not yet been 
achieved, the CeCILL license is available in French and in English and this conforms to the so-called “Loi 
Toubon” of 4 August 1994 that stipulates that contracts implying public bodies have to be written in French. 
Moreover, CeCILL specifies that for lack of conciliatory agreement, the potential lawsuits will be treated by 
Paris courts. This represents an important advantage for French developers and companies which do not have 
to take proceedings into a foreign court, even if it may  hinder foreign collaborations9. At the European level, a 
recent  report  to  the  European  Commission  stresses  that  GPL  and  other  OSS  license  do  not  meet  the 
requirements of the European Union legal framework and therefore there is a  need to set up a well-fitted 
license. “The GPL’s major problem is that the right of communication to the public is not provided explicitly 
5 Soufron and Sallantin  (2005) analyse the increasing variety of free/open source licenses  as different combinations of the four 
types of requirements : 1. the right to access (to the source code), 2. the right to modify, 3. the right to redistribute and 4. the right 
to use.
6National Institute for Research in Informatics and Automatics.
7The  CEA is  the  French acronym for Atomic Energy Department  and the  CNRS if  the  French National  Centre  for Scientific 
Research.
8Gérard Giraudon, chairman for industrial developments and relations at INRIA, in Y.Rocq “Faut-il adopter la license CeCILL”, 
Login, n°120, Sept. 2004.
9 As they do not know the license, they will not be sure that their work would not be appropriate by the French producer. 
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amongst  the granted rights,  and that  a  clause limits  furthermore the granted rights  to what  is  explicitly 
provided by the license. Moreover, the GPL is known for being the most viral license ever, whereas massive 
spreading through dynamic linkage is not the aim of the European Commission.” (IDA/GPOSS, 2004, p.3)
3. From an individual’s benevolent contribution to an 
industrial based model.
As far  as  FLOSS  production was limited to the audience of a  community of  developers apart  from the 
commercial sphere, it only met a very small part of the users’ needs and had  no actual economic significance. 
Things however turned to a radically different situation with the appearance of new adopters, a new demand 
from simple users who aimed to benefit from the development efforts of the FLOSS community without being 
in debt for any counterpart, at least at a monetary level. Such enlargement of the base of users concerned was 
due to the conjunction of three complementary factors.  First  it  is  related to the onset of FLOSS mature 
products with a high level of performance and reliability. Secondly this enlargement  was facilitated by the 
strength of diffusion inherent in Internet and that  acts  additionally to the interconnection capacity of the 
developers’ community. Last but not least the arrival of commercial enterprises devoted to the distribution of 
FLOSS  edited  with  more  sophisticated  designs,  user  interfaces  and  manuals,  tutorials  etc,  is  of  first 
importance for a category of users with a weak level of technical culture and not so used to surfing on Internet. 
This new category of actors in the FLOSS world found  its own way to reconcile commercial requirements 
with the principles of non-appropriation by basing its profitability on selling related services like users’ on-line 
support, updating, debugging, information systems engineering, training...
What appears important here is to understand how this audience enlargement has impacted the developers’ 
motivations and the way it can alter the working of the FLOSS community. It is clear that consequences can 
be identified as two contradictory effects. 
First it can be considered for the developers as a satisfactory sign in so far as it is a result of the successful 
achievement of the objectives of the FLOSS community. The level of adoption of FLOSS products  is  a 
consequence of their intrinsic qualities that  incites some of the users to switch from a former proprietary 
market (or to choose a “FLOSS” product rather than a proprietary  one). As a consequence, this tends to 
reinforce the weight of the open source option, hence the conditions for its practicability in its competition with 
the proprietary model. Most of the FLOSS contributors are, either explicitly or not, cut-throat opponents to 
the Microsoft dominant position and are not reluctant to gain converts. These new users take part ipso facto in 
the achievement of a  critical mass likely to reinforce the future competitive strength of FLOSS.  Another 
positive aspect of the users’ population enlargement is that it provides a wider testing and improvement base, 
the sole question being  that  of  gathering the relevant  information and transmitting it  to the developers’ 
community10. 
Conversely,  other aspects can play a negative role. Of course one may think of the free-riding attitude these 
new users could be accused of having by drawing benefit from public goods without having contributed to its 
production.  But this is not a real problem because most of these simple users wouldn't have been able to 
contribute anyway and this is amply balanced by the positive effects of their presence that have been evoked 
and it can be considered of no impact on the incentives structure of the developers. But this new demand is at 
the origin of a new business potential about which it is to be feared that free riding behavior of opportunistic 
firms could take shape by drawing private benefits from the marketing of products they didn't  help develop.
Of course the developers’ motivations are not only of a utilitarian nature. Lakhani and Wolf (2003) have 
completed a study from a base of 684 programmers involved in 287 projects and have shown that intrinsic 
motivations like the taste for creativity or intellectual stimulation play a major role for most of the developers. 
Nevertheless, this new situation has led to the confrontation of two worlds based on so opposed working rules 
that it  is bound to be of consequence. Voluntary and not  expecting too much in terms of revenue, FLOSS 
developers  then had  to  interact  more and  more frequently with entrepreneurs  with much higher income 
10 See Hapke, Jullien and Zimmermann (2005)
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perspectives. Sometimes the developer becomes entrepreneur, sometimes he is only the supplier of the products 
that will give rise to market activity. Almost always appears a gap that actually affects the tempo and style of 
life but also the level of revenues. This undeniable fact is likely to call into question the structure of incentives 
to contribute for the developers by giving a renewed importance to utilitarian considerations. It can then lower 
the developers’ mobilization hence the efficiency of the cooperative process. As a consequence, frustrated by 
this confrontation, some of the developers  may leave  of the game (Foray and Zimmermann, 2001) or allocate 
a  growing part  of  their  time to  more lucrative activities related or  not  to  the FLOSS  world.  To  better 
understand this question we should look carefully at the more economically driven dimensions of contribution 
incentives.
It has to be recalled that, at the origin, the main motivation for developers was to have at their disposal the 
products they needed and to avoid  duplicating efforts  of software development or improvement. In other 
words and more widely, the collective effort of development generates a usage externality that anybody within 
the community of  developers can  capture.  Thus  it  can  be classed as  a  public good, non-rival  and non-
exclusive11. At a collective level it is a motivation for cooperating but at the individual level it can motivate 
defection and free-riding. Capturing the externality does not depend on having contributed or not; so, like in a 
standard  model of  public good production, individuals only contribute when the marginal utility of  their 
contribution is greater than its marginal cost. Production function being usually of concave shape, this implies 
a limited total amount of the individual efforts. Nevertheless the marginal cost of the cooperation remains often 
very low. Lakhani and Von Hippel (2003) show  this from an on line system of inter-users assistance. Thanks 
to the growing storage capacities and transmission potential given by Internet, it works at insignificant costs. If 
the system is large enough, there is almost always a user that can provide at a minimal cost a solution to a 
problem raised by another user (the probability of a solution existing somewhere in the system is high) and the 
transmission cost is almost nil.
But additionally to the usage externalities and ethical motivations two other kinds of individual incentives have 
to be taken in account: learning and reputation.
In  terms  of  learning,  42%  of  the  programmers  questioned by  Lakhani  and  Wolf  (2003)  consider  the 
improvement of their individual skills as a significant reason to contribute, which ranks this “extrinsic” feature 
in  second  place  of  developers’  motivations.  Programming  is  a  non-stabilized  art  whose  methods  and 
procedures remain often faintly codified and of large diversity, even within the productive organizations of 
large software editors12.  Following and taking part  in the efforts  of a  FLOSS community bring feedback 
effects to the programmer in terms of improvement of his programming skills for at least two reasons. The 
first stems from a learning-by-doing effect, drawn for the involvement in collective effort of development. The 
second is due to the confrontation with an evolving code issued from a diversity of contributions related to a 
wide range of skills, methods and styles of programming. Such learning by interacting is a source of progress 
in the programmer's abilities, and progress greater than any made from his involvement in a more traditional 
development  team,  even  within  large  companies  where  software  production  organization  remains 
compartmentalized and  divided in  small  teams.  This  learning  by  interacting  is   very  significant  for  a 
programmer  wishing to withstand the challenge of the knowledge evolution and this all the more because it 
takes place in the context of a repeated game.
Reputation effects play a complementary role to the former13 and work in a similar way as in the academic 
sphere. This stems from the recognition by peers, in so far as accepted and labeled changes or improvements 
in an open source code are signed by their author, as explicitly expressed in the circulating copies. By contrast 
with the academic world, the main attribute of this recognition capital is to be converted in pecuniary terms 
from  possible job with a firm or a better access to a funding source. 
11 This non-exclusive characteristic is effective within the population of developers.  Beyond this  population it  is  related to the 
technical skills of the user. So simple users can need specific tools, interfaces, support or training that give rise to a new demand 
on the market.
12 Zimmermann (1998).
13 Lerner et Tirole (2002) gather in a same category called "signal incentives", two types of effects "distinct though difficult to 
distinguish", on the one hand the reputation effects and, on the other hand, the satisfaction effects ("ego gratification") directly 
issued from the peers recognition.
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Foray,  Thoron and Zimmermann (2006) show that  incentives related to learning aspects  work differently 
depending on  the level of competences of the individual developers and in complementarity to the benefits 
expected from a commercial exploitation of the software products. Typically, a less experienced individual 
will  be  more attracted by his  own skills  improvement,  while an  accomplished programmer will link his 
contribution to future earnings related to the commercial services related to FLOSS products diffusion. In a 
vertical differentiation model à la Shaked and Sutton with heterogeneous consumers (from their consent to pay 
for those services quality),  the latter will depend on the quality of the available FLOSS product and the level 
of competence of the service provider. Then the most skilled developer contributes more, sets a higher price 
and gets a higher payoff. So, market perspectives do not lead necessarily to opportunistic behaviors but can 
play,  for  the most  skilled,  an  inciting role in  complementarity  to  the learning expectations  for  the less 
experienced developers14. As Demazière & al. (2005) have shown, these two roles are not opposite, but rather 
represent two steps, two periods in a developer’s life (or “career”).
Of course,  it  would be rather naïve to think that  a  pronounced taste for entrepreneurship from practiced 
developers would naturally originate from this result. Reality is always more subtle and combines individual 
and enterprise rationales. Von Hippel (2002) reveals that the members of the FLOSS community are little 
inclined to invest time and money in an entrepreneurial venture. This latter type of incentive should probably 
give rise to enterprise creation for a very limited proportion of developers while a large proportion of these 
highly skilled developers will be hired by firms that would find an economic interest to an involvement in both 
market and non-market spheres. Those developers will continue to contribute to the Open Source efforts for 
part or all of their wage-earning time, while benefiting from earning levels in concordance with the industrial 
rates at their actual qualification level. So Lakhani and Wolf (2003) notice that “a majority of our respondents 
are skilled and experienced professionals working in IT-related jobs, with approximately 40 percent being paid 
to participate in the FLOSS project.”
So company involvement in the FLOSS world appears increasingly as a natural substitute to the individuals' 
voluntary contributions based model. This is all the more important since these new FLOSS industrial actors 
are endowed with a key responsibility for gathering and analysing the huge amount of information originated 
in simple user FLOSS product utilisation and transferring it to the developers’ communities15.
4. From business models to industry structure.
The central question for economics turns to understanding why firms deliberately get involved in FLOSS 
production thus abandoning any monopoly power of the fruit of their efforts, then any perspective of durable 
profits by selling those products as such, but on the contrary allowing a free access to them for users and 
potentialcompetitors. Our aim in this section is then to better understand how firms in each segment in the IT 
industry can cope with this new way of managing its IPR, and the possible impact of their strategic position on 
the global industrial structure.
But  to do this, we have to take in account the recent evolution of the IT industry. During the 1990s, with the 
arrival  of  the  Internet,  the  main  technical  evolution  in  information  technology  was,  of  course,  the 
generalization of computer networking, both inside and outside organizations. Miniaturization also allowed the 
appearance of a new range of “nomad” products like Personal Digital Assistants (PDA, such as Psion and 
Palm),  mobile  phones,  music  players,...  that  have  change  the  modes  of  using  IT  products  and  their 
interrelatedness  within daily life. First of all, network communications and exchanges between heterogeneous 
products and systems are nowadays crucial and require appropriate standards. To this aim open solutions are 
probably the best guarantee for users and producers for product reliability throughout time and the successive 
releases of the products. A second aspect stems from the wide diversity of users and users’ needs that require 
software programs (and more particularly, software packages) to be adapted to the needs and skills of every 
individual without losing the economies of scale. What characterizes the technological evolution of software is 
14 “The differences between the two groups (of contributors) are consistent  with the roles and requirements of the two types of 
F/OSS  participants.  Paid  contributors  are  strongly motivated  by work-related  user  need  (56%)  and  value  professional  status 
(22.8%) more than volunteers. On the other hand, volunteers are more likely to participate because they are trying to improve their 
skills (45.8%) or need the software for non-work purposes (37%)” (Lakhani and Wolf, 2004).
15 See Jullien and Zimmermann (2006b).
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thus the increasing interdependence between software programs built from basic components and modules that 
have to be more and more reused thus becoming increasingly refined and specialized (Zimmermann, 1998). 
Furthermore the related demand for  software customization generates a  renewed services activity for  the 
adaptation of standard-component software programs16.
There is a large diversity of actors in the industry as well in terms of products as in terms of size. Lots of 
innovations and company strategies have led to a progressive reshaping of the industry borders and structure. 
However,  the foundations of  the industry remain unchanged, as  stated by Gérard-Varet  & Zimmermann 
[1985] and Zimmermann [1995]: computers are built by assembling hardware and software units in a given 
architecture,  and these computers  (isolated or  integrated into networks) are  used as  parts  of  information 
systems and solutions. On the base of such technical organization, it is then possible to distinquish four main 
types of “vertical specialization”: component producers, computer and IT devices suppliers, software editors, 
and services companies providing customized software and integration.
So we will organize the discussion by making the distinction among those four large categories of actors. For 
each of them we will first clarify the basic conditions of each type of activities, characteristics of the products 
and characteristics of the users and hence of the demand. This will enable us to draw the main aspects of the 
market structure: base of added value, competitive advantages and nature of the competition. This study will 
help to understand the actors’ IPR management strategies, especially regarding open source IPR management 
adoption, and the incentives to use and to contribute to the development of FLOSS products. We will then 
examine the consequences for future of FLOSS development and its industrial durability.
4.1. Hardware components producers.
They supply the basic components of the electronic devices like chips (Intel, Toshiba), hard disks or cards 
(ATI: graphic cards)... This hardware components industry is characterized by substantial economies of scale 
due to the importance of fixed and sunk costs (R&D, plants...)  In each segment, competition is based on 
innovation (products performances and features) and the performance /  price ratio.  In addition a  growing 
number of users pay attention to the main components that are incorporated in the electronic device they buy 
as a critical feature of the performance of the product. So the brand reputation is also a decisive competitive 
feature that reinforces the oligopolistic nature of the industry for every component sub-market.
In a first approach, these firms could be considered as weakly concerned by IPR management on software. But 
they develop 'drivers' for their own product to give them the ability to interoperate with other components and 
to  be managed by the operating systems.  So,  their  incentive to  use  and develop FLOS  drivers  for  free 
operating systems (such as Linux) is a growing function of such systems market size. Since the beginning of 
the 2000s, some firms like ATI indeed offer such compatible drivers.
But, this remains a marginal contribution, and should not have any immediate serious impact on the structure 
of the FLOSS development organization.
4.2. Computers and IT devices suppliers.
Using these components,  firms build machines,  more or  less dedicated to  specific uses.  At one extreme 
computers can be used for a wide scope of applications provided the software that is acquired and installed on 
them. At the other extreme, video game consoles or  multimedia players are devoted to a  single range of 
applications, while in between, mobile devices like PDAs or mobile phones are built to support a growing 
number of applications17.
16 The  share  for  IBM  service  turnover  jumped  from  32 percent  to  nearly  53 percent  in  eight  years  (1997-2005,  see 
http://www.ibm.com/annualreport/2005/). To explain that, IBM states in the same report that “Clients increasingly seek solutions 
rather than “point-product” purchases of particular technologies and products » (p. 6). HP tried to re-purchase the consulting part of 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers,  which IBM finally acquired.  Compaq, since re-purchased by HP, announced in June 2001 that it was 
giving itself 18 months to become a “service company”.
17 This distinction between specialized and generalist devices is evolving, as Sony intends  its PS3 to be the media center at home. 
But this  has not so far impacted on  the industrial structure.
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4.2.1. Servers.
These computers are intended to manage, deliver and protect information on the networks. They must be high-
performance, stable, but also compatible with network standards. An archetype of server producers is SUN.
This segment of industry is characterized by notable economies of scale due to substantial sunk costs (R&D), 
but also by learning effects, and technological interrelatedness (the more programs running on the machine, the 
bigger the market potential). Firms sell hardware, but more and more usage characteristics (high-performance, 
reliability, “evolutivity”). The users are computer literate people, whom we have called “sophisticated users”, 
or VH ie. “von Hippel users”18, as they are able to express needs in technical terms, to develop software for 
their own needs, and to innovate by themselves.
Earnings in this market come from the computers sales, but also from services of maintenance and assistance 
to the user. 
The  competitive advantage comes from the installed base  (thanks  to  technological  interrelation inducing 
switching cost when a user wants to migrate to another provider) and the application portfolio, the distribution 
channel and the brand reputation, reflecting the hardware performance, the quality of the technical staff (to 
produce innovation and  the right  assistance to  users).  The industry  structure  is  a  stable  oligopoly with 
important barriers to entry and  appropriate role of quality. 
But new strategies, based on more open architectures (PC servers and FLOS operating systems) have been 
emerging, since the beginning of the 2000s, when IBM, followed by HP announced it would implement Linux 
on its machines.
The incentives to use FLOSS are quite easy to understand:
•first the diffusion path. Traditional server manufacturers (such as IBM, or HP) are reproducing the same 
type of behavior that they had in the past vis-à-vis innovations such as Unix or microcomputers. Aware 
that there is a demand, they seek to integrate the new offer in their own offer portfolios, as they did with 
the preceding innovations. So doing, they legitimate the FLOSS offer by placing it at the same level as the 
other operating systems and thus facilitating its diffusion;
•doing so, they adopt a classical “challengers strategy” as  they try to support  a  product which is in 
competition with the dominating standard they do not control. This can be understood as a reply to the 
success of Microsoft and its dominant position on the PC market, but also as a consequence of the arrival 
of new competitors like Dell selling PC servers and of the success of SUN in the Unix market19;
•finally firms whose activity depends on a  standard they do not  control directly have an interest  in 
choosing  the most open as possible, so as to avoid dependence on the strategy of its owner and to stay 
aware and involved in its evolution.
This does not directly really impact the core market of “global players”,  firms like IBM, more and more 
oriented on  service  provision  (maintenance,  hotline)  as  we  shall  see  below,  but  rather  smaller  or  less 
diversified firms like SUN.
In that new scheme, incentives to contribute to FLOSS development are fourfold:
•this is the best way for a server manufacturer to ensure hardware-software compatibility, in a market 
where performances and sustainability are very important,
•it is the only way to ensure users that their needs will be integrated into the future versions of the FLOSS 
product,
•as  explained  by  Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1989),  the  participation  in  the  development  increases  the 
absorptive capacities, and thus the comprehension of a knowledge-based good. In a market where quality 
insurance and on-time delivery matter, this is of importance,
18 In reference, of course, to its work on “users as innovators” (von Hippel, 1988) and specifically on FLOSS production (Lakhani 
and von Hippel 2003, for instance).
19 It worth noting that, on the contrary, SUN, being the leader on the UNIX market, has been reluctant to adopt Linux and is today 
the server constructor which has the most difficulties to adapt is business model, with recurrent losses.
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•in a technical market, contributing is also a signal towards clients as reflecting the firm's technical skills.
This may have a strong influence on the FLOSS development organization. Today, companies are more and 
more involved in Linux, or Apache development, directly with the involvement of their own developers, or 
indirectly, by funding foundations20. Thus these development are increasingly done by a consortium of firms, 
rather than an open community of users.
Concerning the probable evolution of this server sector, the availability of free software programs for this 
market has a double impact. On the one hand, it contributes to generate a standard Unix offer independent of 
the platforms where it is implemented, and it reinforces the attractiveness of the Unix systems (in so far as 
Unix is the privileged support of free-use software programs, even if most of them also work under Windows). 
On the other hand, it puts more pressure on Unix computer manufacturers towards the unification of the Unix 
world around GNU/Linux that offers the additional advantage  of running on PCs (Jullien 1999). 
4.2.2. Microcomputers.
These machines (with a growing market share for laptop computers) are used by end users, mainly as personal 
computers.  In order to clarify the analysis we will split  this segment into the two categories of “quality  
computers”  -QC- targeted at  organizations  or  intensive end-users21 and  “low price  computers”  -LPC-, 
targeted at basic uses (Internet uses, for instance) and low skilled users. Market structures, actors, and IPR 
management are dissimilar.  But some of the suppliers are selling on both markets by differentiating their 
product ranges in order to draw benefits from enlarged scale and scope economies. This appears quite similar 
to other industries like the automobile industry where top- and bottom-of-the-range markets do not work 
similarly but can be partly held by the same manufacturers.
An archetype of “quality computers” supplier could be Dell, or Toshiba, while an archetype of “low price 
computer” could be Acer or Packard Bell.
The  microcomputer  industry  is  characterized by  significant  economies of  scale  due to  high fixed costs 
(automated plants),  but  also to the prices negotiated with component producers  that  have a  high volume 
elasticity.  Competition on the QC market is  rather  based on quality (performances,  reliability,  evolution, 
weight, battery life time), while it is based on prices in the LPC market. QC users are somewhat less computer 
literate than server users; we will call them “intensive frontier users22”. Conversely, LPC is a mass market, 
where users have no particular skills.
Earnings in these markets come from the product sales.
The competitive advantage, additional to the capillarity of the distribution channel, comes from quality-price 
ratio for QC manufacturers, and from the price for LPCs. By the time manufacturers have become technology 
takers and follow the dominant standards as well in terms of hardware as of software components, such as MS 
Windows. Thus, they do not have actual IPR strategies regarding software.
However, incentives to use FLOSS could become far from negligible, for quality and differentiation purposes 
(easiness to develop maintenance and quality insurance services) on the QC market, for price purposes (no 
license fees for the operating system or the office suite) on LPC.
Thus, if in the price driven market incentives to contribute to FLOSS development do not exist, they may 
emerge for QC manufacturers, for similar reasons to those of the servers market, all the more that producers 
are often the same in both markets.
20 For  instance,  Linus  Torvald,  creator  and  leader  of Linux  project,  works  for  Open  Source  Development  Labs  (OSDL),  an 
industrial consortium “dedicated to accelerating the growth and adoption of Linux in the enterprise” http://www.osdl.org/.
21 People playing games, watching video films on their computer.
22 Intensive for the intensiveness of use, and 'frontier' in reference to Kogut and Metiu (2001) definition.
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However, as far as we know, there has not been yet any FLOSS based offer in the microcomputers markets 
coming from the main players23,  even if some suppliers  propose Open Office or  Mozilla to be run in a 
Windows environment on their machines.
4.2.3. Dedicated devices.
As already explained, information systems are nowadays characterized by networking of numerous kinds of 
machines, computers, but also dedicated machines such as PDAs, multimedia players, mobile phones, ... Most 
of these devices are connected to the computer(s), but more and more they also have access to the Internet (via 
Wifi, local networks or adsl technologies), and share applications with the computer (email, personal data 
management, etc.)  Even devices like video game consoles are increasingly connected to an Internet-based 
network.
Archetypes of this evolution are Nokia's mobile phone, Nintendo's game console, Apple's music player (Ipod) 
or Palm's PDA.
This industry is characterized by the same economies of scale as in the computer field: fixed and sunk costs 
(plant and products development), and the price bargaining power with the component producers. 
If all firms sell hardware products in specialized mass markets, their business models are rather different. On 
the one hand, 'players' producers (games and multimedia players) often also sell content products (games, 
music on proprietary standards) and can rely on cross-subsidy strategies. On the other hand, the personal 
communication tools (PCT) producers (PDA, mobile phones) mainly draw their earnings from hardware sales, 
even if they generally also sell accessories and software.
Thus, the competitive advantage is slightly different: ergonomic factors and performance for both types, but 
above all the content portfolio and the installed base on the one hand (player sellers) and the ergonomics 
factors (easiness of use) and the functionalities available on the product on the other.
So, the regime of competition is rather based on vertical differentiation (console efficiency and the size of the 
content  portfolio)  for  player  sellers  while  it  is  rather  characterized  by  horizontal  differentiation  (with 
hedonistic prices) for PCT producers .
As they base their commercial strategy on customers locking through software incompatibility (proprietary 
video games or music cannot be played on other platforms), “player” producers defend strong IP protection24. 
On the contrary, PCT suppliers have begun experiments with FLOSS products since a couple of years:
-Nokia sells an Internet tablet based on Linux and a development community25,
-PDA Operating system editor Palmsource is working on the integration of its product on a Linux kernel26.
So, there are incentives to use FLOSS, outside the core competence sphere of the producers (e.g. ergonomics), 
for cost and compatibility purposes. This also allows better feed back from mobile device advanced users who 
may develop new features. But incentives to contribute to development, apart from some hard-soft (drivers) 
compatibility, remain limited. The involvement of those actors in FLOSS efforts should not have an important 
impact on the development organization, but may strengthen FLOSS diffusion and its de facto standard role.
4.3. Software producers and editors. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s some firms have specialized in software production and edition. Basing their 
earnings on selling licenses, they might be seen as having the greatest interest in opposing  the FLOSS model. 
23 HP proposes  RedHat  Linux on his  enterprise  workstation,  but  not in its  home office solution.  However,  some minor actors 
competiting on price use Linux to propose under $300 PC See http://www.silicon.fr/articles/16046/Tribune-PC-a-moins-de-300-
merci-Linux.html.
24 Even if Sony PS2 can possibly run Linux, Sony having disclosed the specifications of its microprocessor to the Linux community 
(early 2000s)
25 Nokia  770  Internet  Tablet:  http://www.nokiausa.com/770/1,7841,feat:1,00.html.  Development  community: 
http://www.maemo.org/
26 http://www.palmsource.com/opensource/.
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They are in direct competition from this new way of developing software. Nevertheless a growing number 
among them are turning to a decisive involvement in FLOSS development. This is what we aim to understand 
now. For  the needs of  the analysis  we will  distinguish operating systems editors  from more specialized 
program editors, as operating systems are the key components for interoperability.
4.3.1. Technical software editors.
Information technologies infrastructure is composed of the combination of a plurality of 'technical' software 
programs, like data bases, Internet (Web, email) servers, development tools, dedicated application software, 
etc.  They are  called “service  program”  and  constitute  a  “middleware  architecture”,  between the  server 
hardware and the client applications27.
Archetypes of such firms involved in technical software production are Oracle, MySQL, ACT (Ada language 
compiler editor),  Zope corp or  Ilog. They sell technical software solutions,  and additionally to the usual 
economies of scale, the technical aspect of the product induces important learning effects, both on the producer 
and on the user side.
Letting aside products  sales,  earnings  are  increasingly generated by  the  supplying “3A”  complementary 
services:
•assurance (quality, interoperability, stability),
•adaptation to users' needs and businesses,
•assistance to the usage.
In  short,  these  firms  sell  services  of  "maintained,  available  technical  capabilities"  (Gadray,  1998)  for 
sophisticated users. Some of them are billing such services via license fees (plus a la carte services), others 
distribute the product under FLOS licenses and sell only services. All of them are specialized in a  single 
product which corresponds to their core competence. The sector is highly fragmented in small oligopolistic 
markets for each technical need (for example data base software) with a small number of competing solutions, 
each one supported by a single firm or, less often, a consortium, like Zope or ObjectWeb software.
Since the 1990s companies in the sector have been at the origin of important initiatives and innovations in 
terms  of  IPR  management with diversified issues:  although some of  them remain close to  the classical 
licensing business (Oracle), others have decided to adopt a full GPL strategy (ACT), while others propose a 
FLOS base with private add-ons (Zope Corp),  or a double licensing system combining FLOS and private 
license for specific clients and purposes (MySQL).
Although counterintuitive it is probably in this domain that incentives to use and contribute to FLOSS are the 
strongest:
−first,  there  are  historical  reasons.  Most  of  Internet  infrastructure  programs,  developed  firstly  in  the 
university, have been since the beginning  protected by FLOS licenses (example: Sendmail, Apache),
−second, there are marketing and competing reasons. In some markets like data-bases there was a dominant 
actor. For newcomers like MySQL in the data-base market, FLOS was a means to attract potential users and 
so to circumvent the entry barriers related to the installed base. This strategy has become feasible because of 
the characteristics of the users: computer professionals (VH users), able to make technical evaluation of the 
product, to make trials and tests, but also aware of FLOSS principles and in connection with open source 
organization (via mailing lists,  program repository information, contribution to some projects...)  On these 
markets, reputation being above all that of the programs, firms can build their own reputation by diffusing 
these programs to their clients in order to be recognized as their inventors. Finally, there are solid business 
reasons. Openness appears as the best possible signal to guarantee standards conformity and compatibility to 
these advanced and value-added users, giving them access to the source code, and the ability to check how the 
tool  works.  As  these  technical  software  programs  constitute  the  basic  components  for  any  information 
technologies infrastructure, they must be perfectly mastered by their users.  In this context,  the demand in 
27 “There is a significant shift underway in the world of software toward what is called service-oriented architecture (SOA), which 
allows companies to be much more flexible and responsive. As the worldwide leader in middleware, IBM is in a strong position to  
capitalize on the SOA market” (IBM annual report, 2005, p. 4).
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terms of quality, quality assurance, and standards conformity is highly relevant and the signal sent by the 
openness highly worthy.
Nevertheless, the business remains rather close to that of proprietary software-tool builders, like Oracle or 
Ilog.  The  evolution  towards  FLOSS  comes  with  the  evolution  towards  the  production  of  components. 
Practically, all these "component producers" have to face a delicate commercial challenge. The most important 
part of their commercial benefits comes from users’ support and components adaptation to final users’ needs 
or to other “utilization technology” producers. This service offer must be clearly defined in order to transform 
a significant part of these program users into potential clients. Benefits from the joint-services activities have 
to balance development and maintenance costs, especially those of FLOSS program development, on which 
they ground their offer.
Therefore, the objective is to transform a handicap (significant investments) into a commercial advantage, by 
increasing the business feed back from users and considering openness as a way to reduce transaction costs 
and as  a  signal of quality.  Actually, the main evolution for those firms is to switch from a demand pull 
strategy  (functionality  are  developed  to  stimulate/create  the  demand)  to  an  'on-demand'  development 
(development when required and paid for or done by the users). 
In  this  sector,  the  FLOSS  producer(s)  control(s)  development,  and  manage users'  contribution.  If  some 
individual contributor becomes important (in terms of contribution volume/quality/innovative aspect), s/he will 
be hired by the producer(s), with reduced recruitment costs and risks (ACT or MySQL are using this method).
As it is an evolution of the dominant design, if the users’ demand remains strong, the FLOSS strategy should 
diffuse in many technical software sectors.
4.3.2. Operating system editors.
Operating System editors differ from the latter  in so far  as  they specialize in the assembling of multiple 
software programs into one operating system. So they are in a way bridging computer manufacturers and 
application software editors, by supplying a key component of the information system that defines its working 
standard.
Archetypes  of  such  firms  are  Microsoft,  SCO  (Unix  editor),  Mandriva  (merger  of  Mandrakesoft  and 
Conectiva), or SuSE before being absorbed by Novell. The two latter are respectively French and German 
Linux distributors.
They sell a  product (most often bundled with the machine, thanks to Original Equipment Manufacturer –
OEM- agreements), but also joined services (documentation, hotline, update/quality insurance). Once again, 
besides the classical economies of scale, the technical aspect of the product induces important learning effects, 
on the producer side (development) and on the user side (usage). But the main increasing return to adoption is 
probably the technical interrelatedness,  generating heavy switching costs  for  changing from one operating 
system to another and attaching the OS value to the extent of its compatible application software portfolio.
In such a mass market, the competitive advantage is above all the installed base, then the distribution channels 
(OEM agreements), the brand reputation and the technical staff.
The sector (at least the in the micro-computer field) is a  quasi-monopoly controlled by a dominant leader 
(Microsoft) that intends to use this dominant position in order to extend its dominance on related application 
tools. 
Newcomers  entered the  market  in  the micro-computer  fields,  in  the  middle of  the 90s',  as  GNU/Linux 
distribution editor. They sell a commodity (CDRom facilitating the installation of a GNU/Linux distribution 
via technical add-ons), and joined services (hotline, update). Such a strategy can be understood as vertical 
differentiation, addressed to VH users and “intensive frontier users” interested in testing this new operating 
system. This sector works as  an asymmetric oligopoly (RedHat is the leader) with a  partial  geographical 
segmentation (Mandriva in France and Brazil, SuSE in Germany...)
For  these newcomers the incentive to use FLOSS was to capitalize on the Linux user  base and existing 
software, thus to enter in this market at a reasonable price, with an already existing installed base. They have 
to participate in Linux developments, for technical needs (to develop their absorptive capacity, to have a rapid 
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access to the last updates, bug fixes…), but also to build their own reputation (vis-à-vis their clients to whom 
they sell quality insurance and the developers’ community). y Their GPL Linux status means they have to 
publish any modifications under GPL.
Actually, FLOSS distribution does not constitute for them a significant and durable source of income (or, 
more exactly of profit, as the distributors hold back the main part of the payoffs), but is supposed to generate 
a  demand for  maintenance services.  As  for  traditional  editors  like Microsoft,  developing a  distribution 
trademark is of utmost importance since it underlines the quality of the products. It can also open up a wider 
market share towards "naïve" or at least non-expert users, to whom they can offer value-added services, then 
improving their related "ARPU"28. Because of standardization, these offers will probably be limited to some 
main distributors, even if they may gradually become available through several local editors/distributors. But 
this market will remain limited until these products  are installed by computer constructors on workstation and 
end-users machines.
Two main strategies have been put into place to ensure income source of growth: some editors have dedicated 
their distributions towards organizations sector (Red Hat), other have developed a general public service offer 
(Mandriva has introduced “users clubs” in which a fixed yearly subscription gives access to various on-line 
services and software programs). Both strategies  contain strong guarantees, after-sales assurance through 
standard assembling of software programs and standard assistance services.
In both cases,  distribution remains the main asset,  and these companies growingly “intervene” in Linux 
development, thus increasing its consortium orientation.
Bringing together SuSE and Novell, or, in the past, Mandriva and Sun (via the distribution of Star Office), 
reveals that constructors and traditional actors are starting to invest in this field in order to develop the service 
part of their incomes. This is not totally a new market for them since they already distribute Unix versions and 
offer  a  mix of products  and services.  But  the consequence is  to  reduce the still  open opportunities for 
independent editors.
4.4.  Services companies. 
A lot of very diversified service companies in terms of size, geographical area or customers are helping users 
to integrate IT into their activities and provide them with maintenance and assistance, As we cannot analyze 
each specific model of such companies, we will focus on two polar cases: the global service company, such as 
Cap Gemini, or the new Novell (or also IBM) aiming to manage big organizations information system, and the 
small one, specialized, either geographically (in a  city or a  region) or in terms of customers activity (for 
instance, in solutions for the food industry).
They do not sell the same products, nor to the same clients: 
•the global service company sells global information system solution to IT division in large or medium 
size companies and administrations, thus to VH clients29,
•the small service company offers more dedicated solutions (at least on a smaller scale), to SMEs or 
corporate divisions, at local or sectoral level, thus to clients of very heterogeneous competences regarding 
IT. They are often also, resellers for server producers.
Both types of firms draw their  earnings from 3A services (assurance,  adaptation to  the user  needs and 
business, assistance to the user) and have to manage increasing return to adoption due to learning effects. But 
they do not address the same “problem”: for global companies, this is a  3A service on a (global) system, 
granting a high level of availability and efficiency30, also called “SLA, for Service Level Agreement” in the 
telecommunications industry, while small service companies sell more localized or specific solutions.
28 "Average Revenue Per User". This term is mainly used in telecommunications and makes it possible to evaluate the profitability 
of a firm by basing oneself on the average income generated by a user. 
29 “Capgemini's mission is to support its  clients as they transform their  businesses in order to improve performance. Located in  
thirty countries, employing 61,000 people, generating revenues of nearly 7 billion Euros in 2005, the Group offers a wide range of 
integrated services, coordinated around its four disciplines and an array of sector expertise.  These services stretch from strategy 
making  to  maintenance  of  information  systems”.  (CapGemini  2005  annual  report:  http://www.capgemini.com/annual-
report/2005/detail.php?cat=26)
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So, the competitive advantage is based, on one hand, on the know-how of managing such global, complex big 
projects, the brand reputation, and the installed base and, on the other hand, on proximity, related either to 
industrial business or to geographical location.
This leads to rather different regimes of competition:
•due to the size of the projects, the global services market is rather a “coopetitive” oligopoly. Competitive 
to acquire contracts, but cooperative as the solution must be open to clients, providers, specific add-ons, 
and thus abide by standards. These firms cooperate on the definition of the standards, like XML data 
exchange format31,
•proximity market  rather  works  as  “niches”,  the intensity  of  competition depends on the degree of 
specialization required for each specific business market, and of the number of firms active on the local 
market.
Concerning IPR status, the situation in services is somewhat strange in so far as, most of the time, the client is 
the owner of developments made by the service company. So these firms are quite “agnostic” regarding this 
aspect.
But in both cases, the main reason to use FLOSS is clear: as these products are open (and modular) it is easier 
to  adapt  them to  client's  needs.  Using  FLOSS  for  standard  components  (OS,  network,  Internet  server 
software),  which  are  seen  as  “industrial  public  goods”,  facilitates  compatibility  among  the  different 
components, the control of the system evolution and can reduce licenses fees. As corporate clients of global 
services, firms begin to ask for FLOSS products which permits a lower dependence on software editors and 
helps avoid competitors' dominating standard, while fostering VH client feedback32.
Incentives to contribute are weak for proximity service companies and depend on their degree of specialization 
and the innovation dynamics (the more specialized the programs are, the more crucial it is to cling to the 
technical evolutions - but with less users feed back than in technical software case). For global companies, 
there are stronger incentives to contribute. It is a way to have an influence on standard settings, but also to 
integrate users’ requirements into software standard versions. To respect their SLAs, they need to be informed 
of the software evolution (bugs, bug correction, new features...) as quickly as possible. Still following Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989) analysis, contribution increases the absorptive capacities. And, maybe less important, in 
a VH user market, it is also a means to communicate on their technical performances. So, if proximity firms 
do  not  impact  FLOSS  organization,  as  for  server  constructors,  the  implication  of  such  global  service 
companies in the development may lead to close development consortia, excluding, or at least making it harder 
for new developers to contribute.
30 “IBM uses the cash from its  reliable  annuity businesses  to fund investment  in high-value integrated solutions: offerings that 
integrate  services and technology to solve a business  or infrastructure  problem.  Clients  increasingly seek solutions rather  than 
“point-product” purchases of particular technologies and products.” (IBM 2005 annual report, p. 5).
31 See the members of the W3 consortium, in charge of editing the Web norms: http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List
32 Some newcomers  have entered  the  market  specializing in  services  based on FLOSS (and called  themselves  FLOSS Service 
Companies). See Jullien (2003, 2005) for an analysis of the marketing strategy of such companies.
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Hardware Component 
Producers Hardware constructors
Server constructors Micro computers (Laptops) constructors Dedicated products. 
Archetype Intel, ATI SUN
Segmentation between a quality driven market 
(« quality laptop », Dell) and a price driven market 
(« low price laptops » Acer)
Nintendo, Palm, Nokia.
Difference between producers of 'player' system and of 
personal communication tools
Product
Hardware component. high-
performance of use
Hardware and high-performance of 
use (characteristic of use) Hard + high-performance Hard + easiness of use
Video game console, music 
players PDA, mobile phone
Users
Hardware constructors. 
Sophisticated users may be 
prescriptors. Sophisticated users. VH++
Intensive frontier users (B. 
Kogut & A.Metiu) Mass market Mass market Mass market
Earnings, 
added value Product
Hardware, maintenance, 
assistance/hotline.
(HMA model) Hard, differentiated Hard in volume, standard
Integrated product
+ digital content (game, 
music) 
Integrated product
+
application software 
(emerging)
Competitive 
advantage
Component high-performance, 
price, industrial capacity, 
brand
Brand Reputation Installed base
Distribution channel
technical staff
Hardware high-performance
application portfolio
Quality price ratio (price of 
the high-performance)
Reputation, brand
Price.
Distribution channel 
ergonomic factors,
high-performance
Content
 portfolio
ergonomic factors, high-
performance
Complementary features
Competition 
regime (stable) oligopoly.
(stable) Oligopoly.
Market power. Technological lock-
in (high switching costs)
Innovative capacity
Cournot + quality
Horizontal differentiation
Quality Price + market size
Vertical differentiation (high-
performance, content port 
folio)
Horizontal differentiation 
with hedonistic prices
IPR 
management N/A
In transition from close to open 
source None none None. Strong IP protection
Few evolution. Strong IP 
protection
Incentives to 
use FLOSS
Compatibility of the 
component with FLOSS 
1) incumbents: Cheap answer to 
newcomers (PC servers with 
FLOSS quality and features FLOSS price Outside the core competence 
sphere, integration of 
Outside the competence 
sphere, integration of 
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market (mainly Operating 
system)
Microsoft NT solutions, DELL)
2) all: MS-NT competition.
complementary features 
(Internet connexion), the 
price
games: OS no
complementary features 
(Internet connexion)
user development 
integration (photos, email 
access, etc.)
PdA, mobile phone, OS 
possible
Emergence of 
the integration 
of FLOSS into 
the products 00' 00s End of 00' End of 00' End of 00' End of 00'
Incentives to 
contribute to 
FLOSS 
projects
Development of product 
drivers if the market is big 
enough 
Hard-soft compatibility,
users requirements,
quality insurance
Coming.
Hard-soft compatibility 
(drivers),
quality insurance None Weak
Strong (hard soft 
compatibility)
Influence on 
the FLOSS 
development 
organization None
In transition from internal to 
consortia. Not relevant None.
No influence. Following the 
existing organization.
Future 
evolution
Following the diffusion of 
FLOSS.
Consolidation/ stabilization
Emergence Emergence
Emergence on very restricted 
features
Emergence on an open 
embedded OS.
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Software producers-editors Service company
OS producers & editors.
Software Components & tools 
producers
Information System assemblers 
'architecters'.
Small service companies 
(SSLL or SSII)
Archetype
Segmentation between OS producers and editors 
(Microsoft, SCO) and newcomers, using FLOSS 
operating system (Linux) to enter the market via 
distribution edition (RedHat, Mandriva, ex SuSE) MySQL, ACT, Zope firms / Oracle
Cap Gemini, Novell,(but also
the new RedHat, and more and more 
IBM (IBM Global services) or HP) N/P
Product Own Operating System Linux distribution Technical software solution Global Information System solution
possibly dedicated IT 
solution (hard + soft)
Users Mass market
»Enlightened » general 
public Sophisticated users. VH++
Large firms and organization 
including sophisticated users. VH++ Naïve
Earnings, added value licenses
Commodity (CD, 
utilities and tutorial)
Joined services (hotline, 
update)
PHU model
3A service on a product
Assurance (quality),
Adaptation to the user needs and 
business
Assistance to the use
3A service on a system
Assurance (quality),
Adaptation to the user needs and 
business
Assistance to the use
Customized 3A service
Assurance (quality),
Adaptation to the user needs 
and business
Assistance to the use
Competitive 
advantage
Installed base Brand 
Reputation Distribution 
channel
Brand Reputation
Installed base
Distribution channel
technical staff Core competence product
Know-how, experience,
Brand reputation,
installed base
Industry business knowledge 
(cognitive proximity),
geographical proximity
Competition regime
Quasi Monopolistic 
competition
Partial geographical 
segmentation.
Asymmetric oligopoly Oligopoly competition
Coopetitive Oligopoly. Variable on proximity 
market.
IPR management Strong IP protection
GPL kernel and 
complementary 
components (mainly 
GPL ones, but not 
exclusively)
Fine tuned IP management 
(Hybridization: double licensing, 
open based and proprietary 
developments)... 
Hybridization. Agnostic. Important 
role of the standardization game N/R
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Incentives to use 
FLOSS
Few. Outside the core 
competence sphere, 
integration of 
complementary features De facto
Signal to client (respect of the 
standards, compatibility),
standard effect (diffusion and test 
are possible)
better feed-back management 
(externalization of a part of the 
R&D)
To avoid competitor's dominating 
standard.
Strong innovative potential.
Reliably to users requirements/needs Cost, quality and reliability.
Emergence of the 
integration of FLOSS 
into the products Not relevant 90s 90s 00' 00'
Incentives to 
contribute to FLOSS 
projects
Few. Technical needs; 
absorptive capacity.
Technical needs: 
absorptive capacity,
quick access to the last 
updates.
Construction of the 
reputation (clients and 
community)
Legal commitments 
(License)
Technical needs: absorptive 
capacity,
quick access to the last updates.
Construction of the reputation 
(clients and community)
Legal commitments
The firm is linked to the product. 
(License)
Contribution to industrial public 
goods developments
influence on standard settings
Integration of users requirements into 
the standard version of the piece of 
software
Absorptive capacities
Weak.
Depending on innovation 
dynamics, and degree of 
specialization
Influence on the 
FLOSS development 
organization Not relevant
Mix: community + in 
house development.
The firm/consortium controls the 
development.
Users are contributors, and skilled 
contributors are hired by the 
firm/consortium
Targeted communities.
Risk: the standard game may lead to a 
close consortium excluding new 
developers contributions. No influence. As it is.
Future evolution
Possible marginalization. 
Evolution to an open 
strategy.
Declining? RedHat vs 
Ubuntu
-> supply by hardware 
company
-> market growth rate
Possible extension to a large 
set/scope of technical components 
producer.
Dominant design for large 
organizations. growth
5. Business models and attitudes towards FLOSS, A synthesis.
From this description is is now possible to infer an initial characterization and explanation about the variety of 
observable behaviors towards FLOSS. First of all it is important to notice that actors in all the segments of the 
IT industry have begun to take an interest in open source software; in other respects, firms from any of these 
segments seem to conform to very similar patterns.  This section aims to better understand the origin and 
motivation of those attitudes following the characteristics of the concerned segments. However, we will leave 
aside two segments that seem us not to play an important role in this scenario: components producers and 
small services companies. Components companies because they only can have very reduced involvement in 
FLOSS development, limited to the drivers they provide for each operating system of sufficient market share. 
Small services companies, as far as they are concerned, represent  a small and disparate segment unable to 
impact significantly FLOSS development and organization. Regarding FLOSS it is reasonable to consider they 
do not actually distinguish themselves from independent developers.
Leaving these two segments aside it is then clear that, first of all, the level of commitment to FLOSS dynamics 
varies greatly , from a possible driving role to a weak or even inexistent involvement. Additionally we will 
show how the observable characteristic patterns and strategies in every considered segment can be explained 
as derived from the competition regime and the type of  users concerned
Regarding the degree of involvement  in FLOSS dynamics a first remark is related to the significance of the 
diagonal in the following table. It emphasizes that the driving forces and more active actors are those deeply 
engaged in software development and use either as  a  core activity or  as  a  crucial condition of hardware 
performances, as it is the case for server manufacturers deeply involved in the Unix world. In the opposite 
position are hardware suppliers that can only feel concerned by FLOSS for compatibility and price purposes. 
Even if those latter do not have to play an active role in FLOSS development and organization, their existence 
and strategic choices remain of importance in so far as this conditions the evolution of FLOSS market share, 
thus future perspectives within the software industry.
Table 2. Main actors and degree of involvement in  FLOSS dynamics.
Degree of 
involvement
Driving force Active Weak 
(compatibility)
Weak to nil
Software Technical software1 
and architecturers2
OS Editors
Hardware Servers HQL3 and  PCT4 
Players 
(potentially)
LPL5
1 Software Components and tools producers; 2 Information Systems Assemblers; 3 High Quality Laptops; 4 Personal Communication 
Tools; 5 Low Price Laptops
However, in order to further analyse their postures, it is necessary to examine the competition regimes they 
face as well as the types of users that make up their markets.
The regime of competition.
All these segments are characterized by strong imperfect competition regimes due to diverse increasing return 
effects (economies of scale in production, high sunk costs – R&D, distribution channels... -,  technological 
interrelatedness and learning). One single segment (OS for PC computers) can be considered as  a  quasi-
monopoly with very high barriers to entry.
In these oligopolies, differentiation strategies widely play an important role. In the sole segment of low-price 
laptops, where competition is mainly based on prices, the strategies are built on the exploitation of new market 
potential trough vertical differentiation with the traditional PC market. In the other segments, strategies are 
rather of horizontal differentiation either related to the integration of new features and high performance tools 
or to market segmentation through hard-soft-content bundling (mainly based on proprietary standards).
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So new entries  require  either  better  performances/cost  ratios  (for  instance lower price  laptops  or  better 
computation capacities for servers or high quality laptop) or innovative horizontal differentiation (e.g. new 
feature in personal communication tools or technical software tools). But in segments like players hard-soft-
content bundling strategies make it very expensive to enter the market without perspectives of open standards. 
In order to capture a significant market share, a newcomer should add to his device offer (for instance a new 
game console) a content portfolio large enough to attract new customers or to make former customers likely to 
switch from their earlier provider. In thePC market however, IBM's open strategy at the beginning of the 80's, 
debundling hardware from OS, made it possible to enter the hardware segment. Last but not least, horizontal 
differentiation can also target a sub-group of users, with specific needs, not fulfilled by the existing offer, as 
Samsung did when proposing a fold display mobile phone.
The users.
Users have a double role to play, that derives from both their economic and technical standing, Traditionally, 
user  market  power  is  a  function  of  its  buying  capacity.  At  one extreme,  clients  and  contracts  in  the 
“architecture” market are large and generally endowed with significant technical competencies. So they are 
likely to influence economic and technical choices. At the other extreme low price laptops address a mass 
market where individual users have very little budget and few skills. Their influence on market evolution is 
negligible at an individual level but of global importance in terms of elasticity to prices.
Our analysis is mainly based on a typology of users following the type and growing level of their competences. 
Three main types have to be distinguished. The first is the category of “Naïve users” (N) that are not endowed 
with noticeable technical skills and do not weigh very much in economic terms. The second is the category of 
“Kogut-Metiu Users” (KM)  that are not able to contribute to software development but can originate new 
features or  innovations by revealing their own needs and above all represent an irreplaceable testing and 
debugging base. KM users are sensitive to price and quality arguments The third category is that of the “Von 
Hippel Users”  (VH) that  act  as  “sources  of  innovation” able to  contribute  to  software  development by 
proposing improvements or modifications.
Attitudes towards FLOSS
It is thus stimulating to see how crossing the type of users/clients with the type of competitive regimes can 
discriminate the listed sub-markets and to see how this interbreeding can enlighten a growing involvement in 
FLOSS development and organization for commercial actors.
Linux distribution editors have been among the first commercial actors to enter the market using FLOSS. This 
could be seen as obvious on a mass market with rather naive users and a significant prices based competition. 
However, consumers buy computers with an already installed OS and few of them are skilled enough to install 
a different OS. Additionally there are no incentives to do it because the first installed OS has been already paid 
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Table 3. IT sub-markets following the nature of users and competition regimes. 
for with the computer. On the emerging PC server market things work differently. Most if the users, of VH or 
KM type, are aware of the technical questions for installing and configuring an OS. FLOSS give them access 
to a cheaper but also more open and more adaptable Unix-like operating system, than they could find in the 
traditional Unix offer. This gives  FLOSS OS editors an undeniable competitive advantage.
What now needs to be taken  into account is the possible changing attitude of laptop producers towards the 
dominant position of Microsoft in the OS market. First, in the segment of low price laptops (LPL) where users 
are mainly naive, competition is overall based on prices. Installing a FLOSS OS can be considered as a way to 
reduce price, hence to improve the firm's market share, to an enlarged market or at least to permit a new entry 
by compensating not yet accessible economies of scale.  In the high quality laptops  (HQL) things  work 
differently as we will see below.
When looking at the “horizontal oligopoly” column, it is clear that the more skilled users are, the more FLOSS 
concepts and industrial offers are likely to spread. 
At one extreme, in the games consoles segment but  also  to a  lesser  extent in the music player market, 
proprietary formats have introduced, as seen above, a strong bundle on hardware-software-content. Thanks to 
the MP3 standard or new open existing or emerging standards like ogg, new entries are always possible on 
segments like the music players market. On the contrary,  barriers remain high on the video game players 
market due to the scarcity of independent games liable to run on Linux, unlike the PS2,  Xbox and other 
proprietary standards games. Moreover, when they exist, such games seem harder to obtain for naive users.
The opposite polar case is the servers market, where producers were used to providing proprietary solutions 
with proprietary  Unix.  Here suppliers  have to  deal  with high skilled VH users  that  can be of  essential 
contribution in a context of FLOSS opening. The rise of PC servers has permitted some users to avoid such a 
bundling problem; moreover, using Linux allows a cheaper offer (vertical advantage) reusing Unix programs 
(content) portfolio. Thus some firms have been able to enlarge the servers market from VH users likely to 
manage their systems by themselves to KM users, sensitive to prices, but also to the quality of a PC server 
fitted out with Linux. So new entries have been experienced like the Cobalt33 one, but the main actors of the 
Unix “world” have also rapidly developed their own offers, cutting down the sources of vertical differentiation.
Personal communication tools and high quality laptops represent an intermediate case with less skilled users 
(KM+N) and a  weak degree of  involvement of  commercial  actors  only motivated by preoccupations  of 
compatibility and absorptive capacity. 
From the beginning of the year 2000, PCTs architectures and functions have been opened in terms of potential 
applications and external  interoperability.  Operating systems are   no longer at  the heart  of  the products 
differentiation that is rather based on ergonomic aspects and hardware characteristics. Thus in the absence of 
a still established de-facto standard as it stands in the PC market, Linux can be considered as a rational choice 
for PCT suppliers, in so far as it is free of charge and benefits from a community of users able to develop new 
features and new products out of any proprietary control. This, to implement Linux on PCT devices appears 
as a  good strategy in order to limit differentiation to the core competences of the manufacturers (content 
products not being controlled by a firm). 
On the contrary, there is a de-facto standard in the HQL market (Windows products). HQL producers may 
find it hard to switch from Windows to Linux, because this would mean either  acquiring new skills (OS 
management and improvement),  or  sub-contracting this  maintenance to  Linux editors  (RedHat,  SuSE,...) 
which may lead to another dependence and to difficult relations with the dominant provider. Nevertheless, a 
possible future evolution in this sense is likely to arise from the pressure of users becoming more aware of the 
potentialities of switching to FLOSS. In  the near future some of the HQL will probably switch to debundle 
their machines from the associated OS, giving  the KM users the choice between a Windows and a Linux 
platform. 
Finally, in the markets where users are mainly of VH type (technical software and architectures) many firms 
have already turned to  FLOSS  or  are  about  to  do it.  This  represents  an  effective means  to  vertically 
differentiate their offer in terms of performances (technical qualities of the product, better attention to users' 
needs and feedback...) These strategies have been initiated by firms that didn't occupy a dominant position in 
33 Cobalt   was   bought  by  SUN,  which  dissolved  the  products  into  its  own  offer.  See 
http://www.sun.com/hardware/serverappliances/eol.html
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their markets, either newcomers (like MySQL on database market) or in business troubles (like IBM with its 
Eclipse development tool). This FLOSS strategy therefore allowed those firms to reduce their development 
costs,  by integrating the contributions  of  VH users,  but  also to  decrease the marketing costs  by taking 
advantage of the diffusion dynamics within the population of skilled, VH or KM, users.
So this short analysis shows that users occupy a crucial place in the understanding of firms involvement in 
FLOSS  development and organization,  as  summarized in Table  3.  All things  considered,  this  is  not  so 
surprising in so far as the very nature and origin of the open source concept is the willingness of skilled users 
to better satisfy their own needs and to share the result of their efforts. This remains unquestionable.
Tableau 4. The decisive role of the users.
Users  
type
Competition 
regime
Actors/  
« products »
Degree of  
involvement
Motivations to  
FLOSS
Aim 
VH Horiz. Different. 
Oligopoly
Technical software 
and architecturers
Driving force Intrinsic and 
sustained quality 
+ signaling
Entry (My SQL) 
Market share (vertical 
diff.)
VH « Split » 
Oligopoly
Servers 
manufacturers
Active Quality and 
openness within 
Unix world
Response to the PC-
servers rise
KM Strong Monopoly OS editors Active Unix 
Achievements + 
Open standard
Barriers to entry 
bypassing
KM Horiz. Different. 
Oligopoly
High Quality 
Laptops suppliers
Weak (absor-
ptive capacity)
Quality + open 
application tools
Vertical differenciation 
(price/performances)
KM+N Horiz. Different. 
Oligopoly
PCT Weak 
(compatibility)
Additive Features Limit differenciation 
to core compentencies
N * « Split » 
Oligopoly
Players Weak 
(compatibility)
Debundling hard-
soft-content
Barriers to entry 
bypassing
N Price based 
oligopoly
Low Price Laptops 
suppliers
Weak to Nil Prix Price competition
* but VH necessity for open content
6. Conclusion: The critical role of users.
So as  far  as  FLOSS adoption is related to marginal aspects of differentiation, it has little impact on the 
industrial structure and competition. This is generally the case for most of hardware producers, when hard-
soft-content  is  not  bundled  any  more  (servers,  laptops,  PCTs,  DVD  and  MP3  players...)  Their  core 
competences (and hence the barriers to entry) are in the order of the product design (ergonomic, hardware 
efficiency) and the management (production, logistic and marketing) rather than in software development. 
FLOSS  evolution does not  take part  in their  competitive environment and it  becomes clear  for  them to 
integrate external FLOSS components as soon as they are available and can be helpful to their customers. The 
situation is of course different in the segments not yet unbundled, such as game players. Content remains an 
important source of cashflow and content development remains a core competence protected by the proprietary 
nature of the operating systems.
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So IP regime can be opened without calling the firm's competitive advantage into question in so far  as it 
remains out of its core competences. The latter would meanwhile benefit from a strong IP protection regime 
likely to defend its market position. 
But how does this assertion apply to non-hardware firms? As seen before, their core competences have evolved 
and significantly shifted. The main challenge in the computer industry is less and less to supply a solution to a 
given problem at a given time, but increasinglyy deals with short to long term uncertainty regarding IT system 
production and  management.  Users  ask  for  solutions  able  to  protect  them against  uncertainty,  granting 
interoperability, bugs resolution, new needs satisfaction and technical evolutions integration. The trade off 
between available solutions is not posed in terms of their cost of acquisition but of their “TCO” (total cost of 
ownership), into which the future costs and the costs for granting interoperability and adaptability have to be 
estimated. This is precisely what architecturers, technical programs and OS producers sell to VH and KM 
users, aware of these problems and signals. On these markets the FLOSS organization represents an asset for 
producers, who can claim their involvement and succeed in building, sustainable business models.
In such conditions, the open IP regime can be seen as a very efficient solution to the schumpeterian dilemma in 
so far as it permits a wide diffusion of knowledge, while encouraging innovation, as producers are incited to 
contribute to the development of the product they use/sell.
In each of these markets, all the recent new entries have been based on the competitive advantage drawn from 
the FLOSS label: FLOSS OS editors (like RedHat), FLOSS database producer (MySQL), FLOSS service 
companies (VA Linux, or Linagora in France). Today incumbents are also assuming this strategy (IBM with 
Eclipse, SAP opening its data base system, even Microsoft opening some of its technical tools...) This could 
shortly become the benchmark of industrial  organization on these markets,  inducing a  growing control of 
FLOSS development by commercial firms and a spectacular enlargement of open IP regimes in the software 
field.
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